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INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T STATE 042999

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2034  
TAGS: [MTCRE](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [MNUC](#) [ETTC](#) [KSCA](#) [JA](#) [IR](#)  
SUBJECT: SHIPMENT OF JAPANESE-ORIGIN CHEMICAL USED IN  
MISSILE PROPELLANT BOUND FOR IRAN (S)

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS  
1.4 (B), (D), AND (H).

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Tokyo,  
please see paragraph 3.

¶2. (S) Background/Objectives: The United States has information that as of late April 2009, a consignment of over 210 metric tons of toluene diisocyanate (TDI) was scheduled to be loaded on the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) vessel "Sabalan" in South Korea for shipment to Bandar Abbas, Iran. The TDI was originally exported by the Japanese company Mitsui and Company Ltd. from Japan to South Korea. Although the consignee for this shipment is the United Arab Emirates company Chemipex FZE, the actual end-user is Iranian. TDI is not controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), but it can be used to produce binding agents in solid rocket propellant. We are therefore concerned that this shipment could potentially be diverted to missile-related end-users in Iran, and want to encourage Japanese officials to investigate this information.

¶3. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Tokyo approach appropriate host government officials to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 4 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.

¶4. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL JAPAN)

-- We would like to raise with you a matter of proliferation concern and request your government's assistance in investigating this activity.

-- The United States has information that in late April 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)-owned vessel "Sabalan" was scheduled to load a consignment of over 210 metric tons of Japanese-origin toluene diisocyanate (TDI) in South Korea for delivery to Bandar Abbas, Iran.

-- We understand that this shipment of TDI was exported by the Japanese firm Mitsui and Company Ltd. and shipped from Japan to South Korea aboard the vessel "Grand Ocean."

-- Our information indicates that although the consignee for this shipment is the Dubai, UAE company Chemipex FZE, the actual end-user is Iranian.

-- We are bringing this matter to your attention because, although TDI is not controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it could be used to produce the binding agents in solid rocket propellants. As such, we are concerned that it could potentially be

diverted to missile-related end-users in Iran.

-- We encourage you to investigate this activity with a view toward determining whether the Japanese firm exporting this chemical was aware that the ultimate end-user was in Iran and how it was intended to be used.

-- We look forward to continued close cooperation on nonproliferation issues and to hearing of any actions your government takes in response to this information.

End talking points/non-paper

¶5. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann with any questions or follow-up issues related to this case (202-647-1430 - [herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov](mailto:herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov)) and slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR and EAP/J.

¶6. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at [www.state.sgov.gov/demarche](http://www.state.sgov.gov/demarche).

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